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 Plato’s description of the philosopher in the Theaetetus confirms, for many, the 
suspicion that philosophers are an incompetent breed (172c-176a).  The philosopher doesn’t 
know how to make his bed, isn’t sure whether his neighbor is a man or a beast, and is so 
caught up in heavenly speculation that he finds himself falling into wells.  One of Plato’s 
depictions of the philosopher’s otherworldly nature stands in an intriguing contrast to the 
Philebus.  The philosopher, he writes, does not know his way to the marketplace (173c-d); 
compare this to the concession in the Philebus that the inexact sciences ought to be included 
in the best human life, lest we not know our way home (62b).  The otherworldly focus of the 
Theaetetus appears opposed to the decidedly this-worldly focus of the Philebus.  While the 
Theaetetus urges us to flee this world so that we can reside among the gods, the Philebus 
eschews a life it describes as god-like, the life of pure knowledge, devoid of pleasure.  In the 
Theaetetus, Plato identifies the escape from this world to the divine realm with homoiōsis 
theōi; this passage serves as the basis for middle Platonists’ claims that homoiōsis theōi was 
the telos of the Platonic system.1  Plato, in fact, urges us to emulate the divine in dialogues 
ranging from the Symposium through the Laws.2  Following Annas’ and Sedley’s3 seminal 
papers, homoiōsis theōi has received increasing attention among Plato scholars; none, 
however, takes up the puzzling inconsistency with the Philebus.  Why should Plato set up a 
divine ideal in this dialogue, then reject it as an end worth pursuing? 
  Plato makes four references in the Philebus to the ahedonic life.  The first is at 20e-
22c, where Socrates and Protarchus agree that the mixed life is most choice-worthy.  Since it 
is not sufficient on its own, pleasure is not the good; neither, Protarchus points out, is nous.  
This is perhaps true of his nous, Socrates retorts, but divine nous is otherwise (22c).  In the 
second passage, at 32d-33b, Socrates argues that if deterioration is pain and restitution 
pleasure, then at some points, living beings will be in a state of neither pleasure nor pain.  
Nothing prevents one who has chosen the life of pure reason from living in this state, and it 
would be unsurprising if this life turned out to be the most divine, theiotatos, since it would 
be unseemly for gods to experience pleasure or pain.4  In the third passage, at 43b-c, Socrates 
amends his previous account of pleasure and pain: these occur only when the change 
undergone is great enough to be perceptible; it follows, Socrates argues, that the ahedonic life 
is possible.  The final passage is at 54d-55a, where Socrates describes the kompsoi as 
ridiculing those who prefer a life of generation to a life without hunger or thirst, pleasure or 
pain, consisting solely of thinking as purely as possible.5  We might, then, wonder why the 
ahedonic life is not best, why, at the conclusion of the dialogue, Socrates agrees with 
                                               
1 E.g. Alcinous, Didaskalikos, 28.1.   
2 The primary passages which accord an important ethical role to following or imitating god are Alc. 133c; Lg. 
716b-d, 792c-d, 906a-b; Phd. 80e-81a, 82b-c; Phdr. 248a-c, 249c-d, 252d-253c; Rep. 500c-d, 501b, 613a-b; 
Symp. 207c-208b; Tht. 176a-b; Tim. 47b-c, 90b-d. 
3 Annas (1999) and Sedley (1999). 
4 This passage might appear to claim that the ahedonic life is a real possibility, and hence might seem 
inconsistent with Plato’s purported rejection of the purely intellectual life.  However, following Hackforth, I 
believe that the one described as choosing the life of pure reason must be a god, since it does not seem possible 
for humans to live without ever experiencing pleasure or pain (1945, 63, n. 2).  See also Waterfield (1982), 88, 
n. 1. 
5 I should note that in the final two references to the ahedonic life, Plato does not mention the divine; perhaps 
this is because they fall short of the ideal.  The life described at 43b-c perhaps does not count as fully divine 
because, though it is devoid of pleasure and pain, it is not free from undetectable processes of depletion and 
replenishment, which the gods surely do not suffer.  The passage at 54d-55a contains the qualification, 
phronein d’ ēn dunaton hōs hoion te katharōtata.  This suggests that the life is not fully pure, and so falls short 
of the gods’, though one wonders whether, devoid of hunger and thirst, it can count as a potentially human life 
either. 
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Protarchus that the life of pure knowledge falls short of the good, and that the mixed life—a 
life which falls short of the divine—is to be given first honours (67a).   
 Plato’s treatment of the ahedonic life parallels his rejection of the life of pure 
knowledge.  At 59d, Plato proposes that nous and phronēsis only strictly apply to knowledge 
of unchanging realities.  At 62a, its objects are characterized as divine, and at 62b, the state 
itself is called theia epistēmē.  Ultimately, though, egged on by Socrates, Protarchus rejects 
the life comprised solely of divine knowledge and admits its imprecise variants, in order that 
we may have some sort of a life (62b-c).  As in the case of pleasure, so in the case of impure 
knowledge, we must wonder why Plato admits it into his characterization of the best life.  In 
the case of knowledge, Protarchus indicates that the pure life is not achievable, since humans 
must live in this world, and so require correct beliefs about it.  In the case of pleasure, 
however, Plato never supplies any reason, beyond Protarchus’ insistence that no one would 
choose such a life (21e).  This is not much of an explanation, since the preferences of the 
many are never taken very seriously by Plato. 
 That Plato never gives a satisfactory account of the need to incorporate pleasure into 
the best life suggests one way of explaining his rejection of the ahedonic ideal in the Philebus.  
Perhaps we should take Socrates’ endorsement of the mixed life to be ironic, and understand 
him to be hinting that it really is the unmixed life which is best.  This is supported by the fact 
that it is typically Protarchus who insists that no one would choose the life devoid of 
pleasure.  Against this, at the end of the dialogue, when Protarchus concedes that only the 
purest forms of knowledge and pleasure should be admitted into the best life (62a-b), it is 
Socrates who goads him into including the impure forms of knowledge.  The dialogue 
concludes with Socrates recapitulating their conclusion in his own voice, that the mixed life is 
better than either pure life (66d-67a); this would be odd if he did not himself agree. 
 There is an alternate explanation of Plato’s rejection of the divine life, one which I 
think gets closer to the truth.  As Frede suggests, “the paradox that the most godlike state is 
not the best one attainable for human beings” is dissolved by the fact that “our needy natures 
do not permit us to live that way”.6  Though I think that this second proposal is largely 
correct, it is somewhat unsatisfying.  In other dialogues as well, Plato recognizes that we may 
not be able to become fully divine, yet he exhorts us to become as divine as possible; why, 
then, does he shy from this in the Philebus?  Though Plato lets necessary pleasures—those 
due to eating and drinking when needed—into the good mixture (62e), he also admits non-
necessary pleasures, those of learning and of perception (63e).  If these pleasures are not 
necessary for human life, and if they separate us from the divine, then why include them at 
all?  The answer to this requires that we develop a more elaborate version of the second 
proposal.  I shall argue that our mortal natures are such that in the very process of seeking to 
become like god, we inevitably experience pleasure, and so fall short of the fully divine state.   
 In order to establish this, the first topic I need to address is who the gods of the 
Philebus are and why they do not experience pleasure.  As space does not permit me to delve 
into the theology of the Philebus, I can only declare my intention to follow Hackforth, 
Brisson and Menn in distinguishing between two divinities, a transcendent nous, identical to 
the demiurge of the Timaeus and external to the kosmos, and an immanent nous, that of the 
world-soul.7  Suppose we grant this distinction: why, then, do the gods not experience 
pleasure?  Plato never tells us, only commenting that it would be aschēmon (33b).  My 
proposal is that the reason varies, depending on which god we consider.  Turn first to 
transcendent nous.  This is just not the sort of thing that could experience pleasure.  Plato at 
times refers to nous as phronēsis and sophia (28d, 30b); consider how odd, how conceptually 
incoherent, it would be to say that wisdom is pleased.  Furthermore, pleasure is a psychic 
state, but transcendent nous is not in a soul; rather, it is the cause of nous coming to inhere in 
                                               
6 Frede (1993), 33, n. 2. 
7 Hackforth (1936), 4-9; Brisson (1974), 80-4; Menn (1995). 
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the world-soul—in that case, it cannot possibly experience pleasure.8  This brings us to 
cosmic nous.  Cosmic nous is in a soul, as Plato tells us at 30c; why, then, can it not 
experience pleasure?  The reason is that this would violate its nature as the most perfect 
created thing.  At Republic 381b-c, Plato objects to poetic depictions of divine 
transmogrification, since the gods are in the best possible state, and this would imply that they 
voluntarily enter into a worse state.  Similarly, in the Symposium, Plato argues that Eros 
cannot be a god, since he is the desire for the good; the gods are happy, and so, by definition, 
eternally possess the good and lack nothing (202c).  Pleasure, according to Plato, is a process 
whereby some need is satisfied; should the gods experience pleasure, they would reveal 
themselves to have been lacking, and so less than divine. 
 Before turning to Plato’s rejection of the ahedonic life, there is one final piece to set 
into place: what, exactly, is meant by homoiōsis theōi?  I shall propose five models of 
homoiōsis theōi, which I call the isolationist, mimetic-contemplative, direct-contemplative, 
ruling and aretaic models.  I will provide a few examples of each from throughout the 
Platonic corpus.9 
 As the digression in the Theaetetus demonstrates, one way that Plato understands 
homoiōsis theōi is as flight from this world.  Specifically, it is the philosopher’s intellect 
which flees to a realm of pure philosophical activity (173e-174a).  Call this the isolationist 
model, the model in which we come to resemble god by isolating our intellect from earthly 
concerns, and thereby from the body and the lower parts of the soul.  Sedley maintains that 
this causes us to resemble god insofar as we solely identify with our intellect, the divine 
element within us.10   
 In devoting ourselves to philosophy, we come to resemble the gods in another way, 
by engaging in the same activity as them; call this the mimetic-contemplative model.  In the 
Phaedrus, Plato presents the gods as contemplating the forms, then states that the soul which 
imitates god best contemplates the forms as well (248a).  On the third model, the direct-
contemplative model, we resemble the gods not simply because we share in their 
contemplative activity, but because they are what we contemplate.  Beholding the divine 
affects our souls so that they become similar to the gods’.  This is suggested at Timaeus 90c-
d, where Plato claims that we should redirect the revolutions of our heads which were thrown 
off course at birth by learning the revolutions of the universe and so bringing our 
understanding into conformity with its objects.   
 I have been focusing on intellectual activity as a means to approaching the divine 
but, in fact, Plato predominantly presents the gods as engaged in ordering the universe and as 
contemplating the forms for the sake of ruling.11  From this emerges my fourth model, the 
ruling model: we can imitate god’s role as cosmic ruler by ruling our fellow-citizens and, 
most importantly, ourselves.  Thus, at Phaedo 79e-80a, Plato claims that the soul is like the 
divine because it rules over the body, and at Timaeus 41c that the rational part of the soul 
deserves the name “immortal” because it is divine and rules within those willing to follow 
justice. 
 I end with the most significant and frequently emphasized model of homoiōsis theōi 
in Plato, the aretaic model.  It is closely related to its predecessor; through ruling ourselves, 
                                               
8 Some scholars, taking Plato to claim in the Philebus that all nous must inhere in soul, deny that he postulates 
transcendent nous.  The correct response to this objection is to emphasize that at 30c, Plato only claims that 
nous cannot come into being without soul; transcendent nous is, of course, ungenerated.  On this, see Proclus 
Tim. I, 402, Diehl, apud Hackforth (1945), 56-7, n. 2; Hackforth (1936), 7; Menn (1995), ch. 4. 
9  Duerlinger distinguishes three paths of assimilation to god: moral training, dialectic and contemplation (1985, 
321).  However, I see no reason for distinguishing the latter two.  Furthermore, I am opposed to Duerlinger’s 
claim (for which he relies on neo-Platonist evidence) that virtue is only valued as a means to contemplation 
(321).  Though I do not have the space to defend this claim, I believe that for Plato, virtue and contemplation 
are deeply interdependent. 
10 Sedley (1999), 320. 
11 E.g. Phdr. 246e, Tim. 29a-b, Lg. 900d. 
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we not only mimic the ordering activity of god, but also make our souls resemble his in 
virtue.  In the Republic, Plato claims that the gods favour those who make themselves as like 
god as a human can through adopting a virtuous way of life (613a-b).  Similarly, in the Laws, 
Plato writes that sensible men ought to follow god, making their characters resemble his 
through becoming moderate (716c-d).   
 Broadly speaking, within these five models of homoiōsis theōi, we can detect two 
strands: models centered on knowledge and models centered on virtue.  Though Plato does 
not explicitly refer to either of these forms of homoiōsis theōi in the Philebus as such, he does 
link the acquisition of virtue and knowledge to the divine.  We can uncover a reference to the 
aretaic model in the parallel developed between human and cosmic nous (30a).  The core 
function of cosmic nous is to order the universe; in that case, we come to resemble nous by 
ordering ourselves.  Thus, at 59d-e, Socrates likens himself and Protarchus to dēmiourgoi, 
creating the best possible mixture of pleasure and knowledge; presumably each of us is to 
engage in this demiurgic function in crafting a good life for himself.  Furthermore, at 39e, 
Plato claims that the man who is virtuous in all respects is theophilēs.  What about 
knowledge?  At 16c, Plato calls the method of diairesis a gift from the gods, and describes the 
men of old with this knowledge as closer to the gods than ourselves.  At the conclusion of the 
dialogue, he refers to knowledge of the forms as a theia epistēmē (62b).  So the two models of 
homoiōsis theōi we have uncovered—focused on knowledge and virtue—appear at least 
compatible with the Philebus.  At the same time, each of these is explicitly linked to pleasure.  
In the case of virtue, Plato writes that the pleasures which serve virtue and follow it 
everywhere are included in the good life (63e).  In the case of knowledge, Plato assigns the 
fifth rank of the good to the pure pleasures associated with knowledge and perception (66c).   
 Why does Plato take knowledge and virtue to be tied to pleasure?  In his discussion 
of pure pleasures, Plato proposes that there is a pleasure of learning, which results from being 
filled with knowledge (51e-52b).  This analysis bears a strong resemblance to Republic 585a-
e, where Plato claims that knowledge produces the truest pleasure because it fills an 
emptiness in the soul with true being.  For us, the process whereby we gain knowledge and 
come to resemble the gods is a pleasurable filling.  The gods do not experience such pleasure 
because, as Plato tells us in the Symposium, they are in a state of perpetual knowledge and so 
do not philosophein (204a); we, by contrast, must constantly maintain our knowledge through 
study (207e-208a).   
 To turn to our second mode of homoiōsis theōi, Plato never explains why the 
acquisition of virtue should be pleasureful.  However, Frede has a helpful observation on 63e.  
Here, Plato writes that the best human life should include the pleasures “which, becoming 
attendants (opadoi) to complete virtue, as if it were a god, follow it everywhere”.  As Frede 
notes, this calls to mind the image in the Phaedrus, where those who were once attendants 
(opadoi) of Zeus strive to become as like the god as they can (252c-253c).  This suggests that 
the pleasures which follow the goddess, virtue, are those involved in becoming as virtuous as 
possible.12   Throughout the dialogues, Plato treats virtue as a harmonious state of the soul.  In 
the Philebus, he claims that the imposition of limit on the unlimited and establishment of 
harmony produce many beautiful things in the soul, presumably virtues (26b), and he later 
develops a link between symmetria and virtue (64e).  At 31d, Plato claims that the 
disintegration of harmony is pain, its reestablishment pleasure.  If to become virtuous is to 
become harmonized, then this process will inevitably be pleasant.  As with the case of gaining 
knowledge, it is the process of becoming virtuous that we experience as pleasant and which 
marks us off from the gods; the gods never become virtuous, because they are such eternally. 
 Before concluding, I would like to turn to a significant objection to my 
interpretation.  What if the gods do experience pleasure?13  This possibility was first brought 
                                               
12 Frede (1993), 78, n.1.   
13 Due to considerations of space, I cannot extend my discussion of this thesis to other dialogues.  There are two 
passages that I am aware of in the Platonic corpus which can be taken to imply that the gods experience 
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to my attention in a provocative article by Carone; if she is correct, then the tension which I 
have been attempting to resolve between the Philebus and other dialogues would be entirely 
diffused.14  Carone argues that Plato’s statement that it would be unfitting for the gods to 
experience pleasure (33b) is early in the dialogue, when he has yet to introduce the pure 
pleasures, and is contingent upon a restitution-based analysis of pleasure, which she claims 
Plato rejects.15  Indeed, it is hard to see why the pure pleasures of perception need be subject 
to a restitution-based model; if they are exempt, then there is no obvious reason why the gods 
might not experience them.  Carone concedes that at the end of the dialogue Plato again raises 
the possibility of the ahedonic life, attributing it to the kompsoi (53c), but she contends that 
this is based upon an analysis of pleasure as a process of generation, an analysis which she, 
again, takes Plato to reject.16 
 In response, I would urge the following.  It is true that the claim that it would be 
unfitting for the gods to experience pleasure is made before Plato introduces the pure 
pleasures.  But which pleasures are absent that the gods might experience?  Surely not the 
restitutive pleasure of learning.  But the only other pure pleasures Plato mentions are those of 
perceiving pure colours, sounds and smells.  These are pleasures grounded in perception, and, 
given Plato’s consistent preference for contemplation over perception, I am not convinced 
that the gods would pursue these.  Furthermore, it is possible that the pleasures of perception, 
like the pleasures of learning are, in fact, restitutive.  Plato’s phrasing is ambiguous: he lists 
the pure pleasures as “those related to colours said to be beautiful, to shapes and smells and 
sounds, kai hosa tas endeias anaisthētous echonta kai alupous tas plērōseis aisthētas kai 
hēdeias paradidōsin”(51b).  Frede translates this last phrase as epexegetical, revealing that 
the whole category of pure pleasures are preceded by imperceptible lacks,17 a reading which 
receives support from Timaeus 46e-47c, where Plato assigns perceptual processes a restitutive 
role in returning the revolutions of our souls to harmony.   In that case, the restitution-based 
model would still be in place, and Plato’s earlier claim that the gods do not experience 
pleasure would not be overturned.  Finally, there is no definitive evidence that Plato disagrees 
with the kompsoi.  Unlike the case of the anti-hedonists (44c-d), he does not signal his 
rejection of their view, and in fact expresses gratitude to them and endorsement of their 
conclusion (54d).   
 Generally speaking, my argument relies on a conception of human nature as 
imperfect.  If we could become permanently and unchangingly virtuous and knowing, then, 
once we got past the initial generative pleasures, like the gods, we too would be in an 
ahedonic state.  What precludes such a possibility is that human nature is inherently unstable 
and lacking.  In the Symposium, Plato claims that we do not possess knowledge in the 
unchanging manner of the gods, but must constantly replenish it, through study (207e-208a).  
In the Timaeus, Plato writes that our souls are crafted by the en-uranian gods to ensure their 
inferiority (41c); the orbits of our souls are liable to become askew, and require adjustment.  
In the Phaedrus, controlling our soul’s horses and sustaining a vision of the forms is a 
precarious task, requiring constant vigilance (248a).  All of this suggests that we are doomed 
to lives in which we must repeatedly ascend to the sight of the forms, and in which we must 
                                                                                                                    
pleasure.  At Phdr. 247d, the gods are described as feasting upon and enjoying the sight of the forms.  And at 
Tim. 37c, the demiurge is delighted when he beholds the universe in motion.  Against this, though, it should be 
noted that Plato never uses hēdonē and its cognates in these passages, and that the words he uses, agapain, 
eupathein, agasthai and euphrainesthai, need not be taken as synonymous with hēdesthai.  By contrast, Plato 
quite explicitly states in the Philebus, as well as in the Laws (792c-d) and Third Letter (315c) that the gods are 
ahedonic.  In the Laws, in particular, Plato writes that god is in a state between pleasure and pain, to which the 
one who wishes to live like god should aspire. 
14 Carone (2000). 
15 Carone (2000), 262. 
16 Carone (2000), 264-6. 
17 Frede (1993), 60. 
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constantly attend to our psychic constitutions, struggling to regain and maintain inner 
harmony. 
 Ultimately, the Philebus strikes me as not so much opposed to the dialogues 
enjoining us to pursue homoiōsis theōi, as differing in focus.  In dialogues such as the 
Theaetetus, where Plato exhorts us to imitate the gods, he highlights the ways in which we 
can come to resemble them.  The Philebus, of course, is a dialogue about pleasure, and here, 
Plato’s eye is on how we are incapable of the ahedonic state of the gods.  Another way of 
thinking of this is to note, following Russell,18 that when Plato urges us to emulate god, he 
typically adds the rider, “to the degree possible”.19  Part of the gap between the Philebus and 
other dialogues lies in which side of this caveat is emphasized: while in the Theaetetus, 
Republic and Laws, Plato emphasizes how much we can come to resemble god, in the 
Philebus, Plato’s focus is on how far we fall short—after all, if we were gods, we would not 
have to strive to be like them.  Surprisingly, though the Philebus appears an optimistic 
dialogue, focused on the happy human life, it contains a pessimistic tinge.  Of course, for 
many of us, the fact that knowledge and virtue can be gained at all, and that they are to be 
gained with pleasure, as well as hard work, turns out to be occasion for relief and delight, and 
hardly a cause for regret.  
 
Claremont McKenna College 
 
                                               
18 Russell (2005), 148; see also Rutenber (1946), 38-9. 
19 E.g. Rep. 613a-b, Tht. 176b, Tim. 90c.  See also Phd. 65a, 67a; Rep. 383c, 500c-d; Phdr. 253a; Lg. 716c-d. 
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